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1 Introduction
The flexible exchange rate version of the Mundell-Fleming model (Fleming (1962), Mundell
(1963)) lays out the case for how flexible exchange rates allow monetary authorities to pursue
domestic macroeconomic objectives in a world of free capital flows. Post-crisis discussions of
monetary spillovers have revisited this classic proposition. The BIS report on global liquidity
(BIS 2011) is a recent exposition of cross-border monetary spillovers and it has been followed
by an active literature which has examined the extent to which floating exchange rates fail to
insulate monetary policy from external developments (see, for instance, Agrippino and Rey
(2015), Rey, (2013, 2015), Bruno and Shin (2015a, 2015b)).
The broad picture emerging from this literature is that of a significant global comove-
ment in leverage and asset prices that is related to US monetary policy. This global factor
is associated with surge and sudden stops in capital flows, and with large exchange rate
fluctuations that deviate from uncovered interest parity (UIP).
This paper offers a theoretical model in which the differential between the interest rate
on an international funding currency and that of a small open economy generates excessive
fluctuations in leverage, bond prices, and inflation in the small open economy. This instability
is generated by the capital flows of global investors seeking to reap self-justified rents from
carry trades. The rents are self-justified in the sense that large capital inflows (outflows)
generate positive (negative) abnormal returns on carry trades that justify the flows in the
first place.
We contribute to the theoretical literature on self-fulfilling international crises pioneered
by Obstfeld (1996) along two dimensions. First, we write down a fully dynamic coordination
game among global investors in infinite horizon in which investors’ beliefs about each others’
future positions are uniquely determined along the equilibrium path. Shocks to the interest-
rate differential serve as their coordination device and affect their collective beliefs in a highly
non-linear fashion. This way, we show that coordination games are not only useful to model
snapshot crisis episodes, but can also help understand the protracted build-up of financial
fragility that precedes them. Second, we embed this coordination game in a simple but
standard monetary model of a small open economy. This enables us to identify the set of
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primitive parameters of the domestic economy under which it lends itself to such destabilizing
speculation.
We proceeds in two steps. We first couch the novel economic mechanism through which
global investors’ portfolio choice generates monetary spillovers in a small open economy in
the simplest possible environment: a perfect-foresight model. Monetary spillovers stem from
two ingredients. First, the central bank in the small open economy uses an interest-rate rule
that responds to global investors’ inflows only insofar as they affect the price level, but that
does not track their direct impact on asset prices (and thus on the real rate). As a result
inflows (outflows) are deflationary (inflationary). The second ingredient is the assumption
(borne out by the data) that the non tradable goods of the small economy have more rigid
prices than the tradable ones. This implies that the inflationary impact of capital flows
must operate through the prices of tradable goods, and thus leads to large fluctuations in
the nominal exchange rate. We show that for reasonable parameters of the model, there are
two stable steady-state solutions — one associated with capital inflows and the other with
capital outflows. The steady state with capital inflows is associated with an appreciation of
the domestic currency and a failure of uncovered interest parity (UIP) yielding an abnormal
positive return on carry trades, and the steady state with capital outflows is its mirror image.
In the second step of our analysis, we build a stochastic version of this perfect-foresight
model. We introduce exogenous shocks to the dollar interest rate and use the global-game
techniques of Burdzy, Frankel, and Pauzner (2000, 2001) to refine the outcome of the model
to a unique solution. We show that the state space can be partitioned into two regions—
a region where all global investors pile into the local currency bond, and one in which
they short these bonds to be long US dollar-denominated assets. The transition between
the two regions can be triggered by small fluctuations in the US dollar interest rate and
the endogenous changes in domestic financial conditions. The unique equilibrium features
dynamics that are reminiscent of boom-bust cycles. An easing of US monetary conditions
typically creates a prolonged episode of capital inflows, benign domestic financial conditions,
and appreciation of the currency for the small economy. Subsequent small increases in the US
rate do not immediately reverse the up-phase of the cycle but will abruptly reverse it when
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a “tantrum” boundary is reached. Hitting the “tantrum” boundary triggers a large currency
depreciation, capital outflows, a crash in the domestic bond market, and inflationary pressure.
These features are reminiscent of that experienced by a number of emerging economies during
the 2013 “taper tantrum” episode that followed the announcement of a possible tapering of
the highly accommodative US monetary policy.
Related Literature
Our approach is most closely related to models of financial instability which involve co-
ordination problems and self-fulfilling speculative episodes. In a similar spirit, Farhi and
Tirole (2012) and Schneider and Tornell (2004) offer related models of “collective moral haz-
ard” in which the government bails out speculators if their aggregate losses are sufficiently
large, thereby inducing a coordination motive among speculators. We formalise the dynamic
coordination game among investors using the dynamic extension of global-game methods de-
veloped by Frankel and Pauzner (2000) and Burdzy, Frankel, and Pauzner (2001) to obtain
a unique equilibrium outcome. We show that these global-game tools can be adapted to
the situation where coordination motives coexist with congestion effects. This is important
because most financial models with coordination motives also feature congestion effects. In
a model of bank run, Goldstein and Pauzner (2004) adapt static global-game techniques to
the case in which strategic complementarities similarly fail to hold everywhere. In a model of
sovereign-debt refinancing, He, Krishnamurthy, and Milbradt (2015) also apply global-game
techniques in a context in which a large debt size comes at the benefit of smaller congestion
effects but at the cost of a higher rollover risk.
Most closely related to our work, He and Xiong (2012) apply the equilibrium selection
techniques developed by Burdzy, Frankel, and Pauzner (2001) in a dynamic financial context
— the roll-over of short-term debt.
We also relate to the theoretical literature that seeks to model both crises and the build
up of fragility that precedes them. Lorenzoni (2008) builds a model in which commitment
problems on both lending and borrowing sides lead to excessive borrowing ex-ante and ex-
cessive volatility ex-post. Sannikov (2014) endogenizes the build up of fragility by assuming
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that two assets are available, an illiquid one that generates more with experts and less with
households than a liquid one. A key driver is that the illiquidity of an asset (the value it
generates when operated by households) has no impact on the steady-state target leverage
of experts, so that endogenous illiquidity risk taking by experts in quiet times alone can lead
to large crises even absent large fundamental risk.
Our paper also relates to the literature on portfolio choice in incomplete markets. In
a recent contribution, Gabaix and Maggiori (2015) introduce financial intermediaries that
operate in incomplete global financial markets by intermediating gains from trade between
countries. We also model global investors as financial institutions operating in incomplete
markets.1 Garleanu, Panageas and Yu (2015) present a model in which investors face costs
to extend their participation in markets located on a circle for diversification purposes. Our
result that the profitability of investment increases in the weight of others’ participation bears
similarities with their finding that participation and leverage reinforce each other, possibly
leading to multiple equilibria.
The relationship between exchange rates and leverage is our point of contact with the
literature on the determinants of vulnerability to financial crises. Gourinchas and Obstfeld
(2012) conduct an empirical study using data from 1973 to 2010 and find that two factors
emerge consistently as the most robust and significant predictors of financial crises, namely
a rapid increase in leverage and a sharp real appreciation of the currency. The build up of
leverage and currency appreciation also lead to a higher probability of future sharp delever-
aging and important capital outflows in our model. Schularick and Taylor (2012) similarly
highlight the role of leverage in financial vulnerability, especially that associated with the
banking sector.
Finally, our results complement the recent work on the risk-taking channel of currency
appreciation, introduced by Bruno and Shin (2015a, 2015b) in the context of cross-border
banking, whereby currency mismatches on borrowers’ balance sheets lead to credit supply
effects of exchange rate fluctuations. The risk-taking channel relies on Value-at-Risk (VaR)-
induced behaviour that is sensitive to tail risks of credit portfolios. Hofmann, Shim and Shin
1We discuss interesting differences between their conclusions and ours below in Section 2.4.
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(2015) apply the risk-taking channel to domestic currency sovereign yields through shifts in
the tail risk of diversified local currency sovereign bond portfolios. Whereas existing models
of the risk-taking channel are static, our global game model solves for the dynamic path of
the key macro variables.
2 A simple perfect-foresight model
Time is discrete and is indexed by t. There are two types of agents, households populating
a small open economy and global investors. There is a single tradable good that has a fixed
unit price in US dollars.
2.1 Households
The households live in a small open economy. They use a domestic currency that trades at
St dollars per unit at date t, where the exchange rate St will be determined in equilibrium.
At each date, a unit mass of households are born. Households live for two dates, consume
when young and old, and work when old. Each household receives an initial endowment
at birth with nominal value PtW ≥ 0, where Pt is the domestic price level.2 The cohort
that is born at date t has quasi-linear preferences over bundles of consumption and labor
(Ct, Ct+1, Nt+1)
U (Ct, Ct+1, Nt+1) = lnCt +
Ct+1 −N1+ηt+1
R
, (1)
where η > 0 and R > 1 is the subjective discount rate.
Domestic consumption services Ct are produced combining the tradable good C
T
t and
two nontradable goods CN1t and C
N2
t according to the technology
Ct =
(
CTt
)α (
CN1t
)β (
CN2t
)γ
ααββγγ
, (2)
where α, β, γ ∈ (0, 1) and α+β+γ = 1. Domestic firms set by old households use labor input
to produce. Due to quasi-linear preferences, our results do not depend on the specification
2If the endowment of young households is zero, then the global investors introduced below cannot have an
aggregate short position in domestic bonds. A strictly positive endowment plays no other role than allowing
such short positions.
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of the firms’ production functions. All that is needed is that both nontradable goods are
produced in finite, non zero quantities at each date. Households collect labor income and
the profits from their firms when old.
Nominal rigidities. An important ingredient of the model is that the prices of the
nontradable goods are less flexible than that of the tradable good.3 We formalize this as
follows. First, we posit that the tradable good has a flexible price P Tt in the domestic
currency, and that the law of one price holds (“PPP at the docks”). Second, the first
nontradable good N1 also has a fully flexible price P
N1
t . A linear technology enables the
transformation of each date-t unit of N1 into F units of the tradable good, where F > 0.
The second nontradable good N2 has a fixed price that we normalize to 1 without loss of
generality. Denoting P Tt , P
N1
t , and P
N2
t the respective prices of these three goods, we have:
P Tt St = 1, (3)
PN1t = FP
T
t , (4)
PN2t = 1. (5)
Equation (3) is the statement of the law of one price. Equation (4) states that domestic
households are indifferent between purchasing the tradable good or producing it out of N1.
Finally, (5) is the statement of the rigidity of N2’s price.
The introduction of the nontradable good with flexible price N1 allows us to decouple the
“openness” of the economy as measured by α = 1− β − γ from the flexibility of the overall
price index to changes in the tradable goods price, as measured by 1− γ. As is well-known,
optimal spending across goods implies that prices must satisfy
Pt = (P
T
t )
α(PN1t )
β(PN2t )
γ
=
(
P Tt
)1−γ
F β, (6)
where (6) follows from (4) and (5).
Households have access to the domestic bond market, in which risk-free one-period bonds
denominated in the domestic currency are available in zero net supply. The nominal interest
3This is consistent with evidence documented by Burstein, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2005).
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rate on these bonds is set by the domestic central bank according to a rule to be described
below.
2.2 Global investors
A unit mass of global investors have access to both the local-currency bond market and to
US dollar-denominated one-period bonds. The exogenous nominal return on US dollar bonds
is denoted by I∗ > 0. Global investors consume outside the local economy, and their utility
is increasing in the consumption of the tradable good.4
In forming their financial portfolios, global investors face limits on the size of their expo-
sures in domestic bonds, reflecting leverage constraints or exposure caps imposed by internal
risk limits.5 We assume that the position in domestic bonds of any investor must lie in the
interval [PtL
−, PtL+], where these limits are denominated in the domestic currency and
L− > −W,
which ensures that households always consume positively.6
The return to a global investor from investing in the local currency bond market relative
to the return on dollar bonds is given by
Θt+1 =
St+1
St
It+1
I∗
(7)
We may interpret Θt+1 as the return to a carry-trade position in which the investor borrows
dollars at rate I∗ and then invests the proceeds in the local currency bond yielding It+1.
Uncovered interest parity (UIP) holds when Θt+1 = 1.
We denote Lt ∈ [L−, L+] the real net aggregate borrowing by young households from
global investors at date t (possibly negative). Since the economy is deterministic, optimal
4Whether they also derive utility from consuming other goods, and the curvature of their utility function
are immaterial. This is only true because the economy is deterministic, and will no longer be so in Section 3.
5We do not consider the microfoundations of these limits. As is well-known, they could result from
example from agency problems within globally investing firms such as, for example, a cash-flow diversion
problem.
6Setting lending limits in real terms simplifies the exposition but is not crucial. Nominal rigidities in
trading limits would actually amplify our results.
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portfolio choice by global investors implies that Lt must satisfy:
Lt

= L+ if Θt+1 > 1,
= L− if Θt+1 < 1,
∈ (L−, L+) if Θt+1 = 1.
(8)
In words, global investors choose corner portfolios unless they are indifferent between invest-
ing in US-dollar denominated assets or in domestic bonds.
2.3 Monetary policy rule
We suppose that the domestic monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate between t
and t+ 1, It+1, following the interest-rate feedback rule:
It+1 = R
(
Pt
Pt−1
)1+Φ
(9)
where
Φ > 0 (10)
The interest rate rule (9) follows the Taylor principle from (10) in that the nominal
interest rate reacts more than one-for-one to the price level change. The Taylor principle
is necessary for a determinate solution in many classes of monetary models (Taylor, 1993;
Woodford, 2001), and our model also shares this feature as we see below. Setting the target
inflation rate to zero is only a normalization.
Given our quasi-linear preferences, households’ Euler equation can be written as
It+1 =
Pt+1
Pt
R
(Lt +W )
(11)
2.4 Steady-state solution
We are now equipped to solve for the perfect-foresight steady-states of this economy. A
steady state must be such that the domestic economy is in equilibrium and global investors
form optimal portfolios at each date. Formally, a perfect-foresight steady-state is a solution
to (3), (6), (8), (9), and (11).
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We introduce the following notation.
r = lnR,
δ = ln
(
R
I∗
)
,
θt = ln Θt,
it = ln It,
st = lnSt,
lt = ln(Lt +W ),
pit+1 = ln
(
Pt+1
Pt
)
.
The Euler equation (11) and the interest-rate rule (9) can be gathered as follows:
it+1 = r − lt + pit+1, (12)
it+1 = r + (1 + Φ) pit. (13)
Together, they define a linear-difference equation for the path of inflation:
pit =
pit+1 − lt
1 + Φ
(14)
which has a unique non-exploding solution:
pit = −
∑
k≥0
lt+k
(1 + Φ)k+1
. (15)
Equation (15) shows that current inflation is affected by current and future capital inflows
(lt+k)k≥0. The Taylor principle ensures that pit is well-defined, since lt+k is bounded and
Φ > 0.
This expression for pit highlights that our model shares the generic feature of standard
interest-rule based monetary models that inflation reflects anticipated future “shocks.” In
our context, the “shocks” are not the usual exogenously assumed policy shocks, but rather
are the consequence of optimal portfolio choice by global investors.
Using (6) and (3), we have:
pit+1 = − (1− γ) (st+1 − st) . (16)
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Equation (16) is our exchange rate pass-through equation that expresses inflation in terms
of exchange rate depreciation.
Plugging (16) and (11) in (7), we have
θt+1 = st+1 − st + it+1 − ln I∗,
= − 1
1− γpit+1 + pit+1 − lt + δ, (17)
=
γ
1− γ
∑
k≥0
lt+k+1
(1 + Φ)k+1
− lt + δ. (18)
where (17) follows from (16) and the Euler equation, and (18) follows from the solution for
pit+1 given by (15).
We now determine the steady states in which the debt level l is constant over time. We
introduce
l ≡ ln(W + L−), (19)
l ≡ ln(W + L+). (20)
For brevity the remainder fo the paper focusses on the case in which
l < 0 < l.
Proposition 1 (Multiplicity of steady-states) Suppose there exists l∗ ∈ (l, l) such that
γ − Φ (1− γ)
(1− γ) Φ l
∗ + δ = 0.
Then l = l∗ is a steady state in which uncovered interest parity (UIP) holds. If Φ(1−γ) > γ,
there is no other steady-state solution. However, if Φ(1 − γ) < γ, there are two further
steady-state solutions; there is a steady state with maximum capital inflows (l = l), and there
is a steady state with maximum capital outflows (l = l).
Proof of Proposition 1. First, note that for l fixed, the relative return to investing in the
local currency bond given by (18) can be written as
θ =
γ − Φ (1− γ)
(1− γ) Φ l + δ (21)
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Let l∗ ∈ (l, l) be such that θ = 0. For such an l∗ investors are indifferent between investing
in the local currency bond or the dollar bond. Hence, l∗ is a steady-state solution of our
model. If Φ(1−γ) > γ, this is the only steady-state solution, since θ is decreasing in l: More
(less) foreign lending makes foreign lending unprofitable (profitable). This case corresponds
in particular to the fully flexible benchmark (γ=0).
Now consider the case where γ > Φ(1−γ). In this case, we have two further steady-state
solutions corresponding to the corner solutions l = l¯ and l = l.
First, suppose that all investors choose to invest in the local currency bond. Then l = l,
so that θ > 0, implying that investing in the local currency bond is strictly better than
investing in the dollar bond. Hence, all investors invest in the local currency bond, thereby
sustaining maximum inflows l = l as a steady-state solution. Conversely, suppose that all
investors choose to invest in the dollar bond. Then l = l, so that θ < 0, implying that
investing in the dollar bond is strictly better. Hence all investors invest in the dollar bond,
sustaining l = l as a steady state. 
Proposition 1 highlights the possibility of both self-fulfilling capital flow surges and out-
flows as extremal steady-state solutions of our model. These steady-states correspond to
binding risk limits for global investors, failure of UIP (θ 6= 1), and off-target inflation.
The intuition behind the multiplicity of steady states is as follows. First, as is transparent
from relation (15), capital inflows push local bond prices up and this compression in yields
leads inflation to be below target. Second, since the prices of nontradable goods are relatively
stickier than that of the tradable good, this deflationary impact must operate relatively more
through the prices of tradable goods, and thus through a large appreciation of the nominal
exchange rate, as formalized by (16). If these two effects are sufficiently important, then
capital inflows generate a sufficiently large exchange rate appreciation that this more than
compensates global investors for holding expensive local bonds. This yields arbitrage profits,
and the anticipation of future large capital inflows in the small open economy is self-fulfilling.
The model is essentially symmetric, so everything also works the mirror-image way in the
steady-state with extremal outflows.
It is interesting to contrast this mechanism with that in Gabaix and Maggiori (2015).
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In their setup, tighter financial constraints lead to larger excess returns on carry trades
because it forces global investors to leave carry-trade profits on the table. Here, conversely,
if one interprets tighter financial constraints as narrower trading limits, then such tighter
constraints lead to smaller excess returns on carry trades. This is because these excess
returns are generated by the destabilizing impact of foreign capital flows in or out of the
small economy. This impact increases in the size of the carry trade.
The condition γ > Φ(1− γ) is satisfied when nominal rigidities are sufficiently important
(γ sufficiently large) and monetary policy sufficiently passive (Φ sufficiently small). Both con-
ditions imply that small changes in inflation expectations are consistent with large swings
in the nominal exchange rate.7 Otherwise stated, the domestic monetary authority could
eliminate extremal steady-states by committing to a sufficiently large Φ, which means com-
mitting to a sufficiently large reduction in the policy rate in the presence of large capital
inflows and/or large appreciation of the exchange rate.
Remark on the monetary rule. The reader may have noticed that the interest-rate
rule (10) does not fully track the impact of foreign flows on domestic bond prices and thus
on the real rate. By doing so, a rule of the form
it+1 = r − lt + (1 + Φ)pit (22)
would eliminate the effect of inflows on the domestic CPI and thus on carry-trades returns.
We find it realistic, however, to assume that the flows of “hot money” are more nimble than
the domestic monetary authority. In addition, we believe that the extremal steady states
could still arise under a rule such as (22) in a richer model of nominal rigidities.8
The purpose of this perfect-foresight analysis is to present our novel mechanism for self-
justified destabilizing capital flows in the simplest and most transparent environment. Yet
this perfect-foresight analysis raises two obvious isses:
7The standard assumption Φ = 0.5 implies that extremal steady-states can occur as soon as γ > 1/3,
corresponding to a fairly low level of nominal rigidities.
8Suppose for example that the consumption boom due to inflows results in inflation in the price of
nontradable goods through overheating. If rule (22) maintains the overall price index constant, then this
inflationary pressure must be compensated with deflation in the price of the tradable good. Such a deflation, if
sufficiently large, will again create room for self-fulfilling excess returns on carry trades through the associated
increase in the nominal exchange rate.
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• The multiplicity of steady-states leaves unclear how agents can coordinate on any
equilibrium behavior at all.
• If carry traders hold the same position forever, then the prices of non tradables and
the real-rate target of the central bank should eventually adjust.
We now turn to a stochastic version of our benchmark model and employ global-game
techniques to tie down a unique dynamic solution that solves both issues. The goal of the
analysis is to provide the theoretical foundations of the dynamics of an open economy in
which surges of capital inflows can be explained alongside the sudden reversals that happen
in practice.
3 Stochastic model
We will proceed to develop a stochastic version of our model, and then solve for the uniquely
determined time paths by using perturbation methods that resemble global-game methods,
but which are better suited for dynamic contexts.
Begin by assuming that time is continuous. The fixed integer dates of the previous section
are replaced by the arrival times of a Poisson process with intensity µ > 0. Namely, at each
arrival time Tn, a new cohort of households are born, and die at the next arrival time Tn+1.
They value consumption and leisure only at these two dates, with preferences that are the
same as that in our benchmark set-up:9
lnCTn +
1
R
ETn
[
CTn+1 −N1+ηTn+1
]
.
At each arrival date Tn, the central bank sets a nominal rate ITn+1 between Tn and Tn+1
according to the rule:
ITn+1 = R
(
PTn
PTn−1
)1+Φ
(23)
9The unconventional assumption that households discount consumption at a random future date at a
fixed discount factor R greatly simplifies the algebra but plays no other role. Accordingly, we will define the
interest rate on US and local bonds as a fixed coupon between two arrival dates.
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Replacing integer dates with dates that arrive at a constant rate is not essential, and our
set-up is designed for tractability. It is designed to ensure that the global investors’ portfolio
choice problem described below is time homogeneous.
We now are more specific than in the previous section about global investors’ preferences
in order to characterise their portfolio choice. We follow Gabaix and Maggiori (2015) and
model global investors as a unit-mass of financial institutions that can form zero-cost portfo-
lios in bonds denominated in either currency at each date Tn with size within [PTnL
−, PTnL
+]
(in units of the domestic currency). The date-Tn trade is unwound at the next date Tn+1 and
the realised profit or loss is paid to the old households at this date. Each firm maximises
the expected value of future consumption paid to all future households discounted at the
households’ subjective discount rate R between two arrival dates. We still suppose that
ln(L− +W ) ≡ l < 0 < ln(L+ +W ) ≡ l. (24)
The two following modifications to the benchmark model are key to generate equilibrium
uniqueness.
Shocks to the US dollar rate. First, we assume that the interest rate on US dollar-
denominated bonds between two arrival dates Tn and Tn+1 is given by
I∗Tn+1 = R (1− wTn) , (25)
where wt is a Wiener process with volatility σ and no drift.
10
Imperfect liquidity. Second, we assume that the capital market is imperfectly liquid in
the following sense. Each investor can revise his investment strategy only at switching dates
that are generated by a Poisson process with intensity λ > 0. These switching dates are
independent across investors. In between two switching dates, each global investor commits
to a strategy and thus to lend to (or borrow from) households a committed amount within
[PTnL
−, PTnL
+] at each arrival date Tn (if any).
This form of execution uncertainty has a key property that will yield equilibrium unique-
ness: Every investor knows that some other investors will revise their trading strategy almost
surely between his current switching date and the next one.
10We will discuss more general stochastic processes below. Proofs are simpler in the case of a standard
Wiener process.
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Remark. (Arbitrage versus good deal and the role of trading limits) It is
important to stress that the exogenous trading limits [PTnL
−, PTnL
+] fulfill a very different
role from that played in Section 2. In the previous section, it was necessary to impose such
limits regardless of global investors’ preferences because carry trades were (possibly) textbook
arbitrage opportunities given the deterministic environment. As is well-known, any agent
with increasing utility over consumption has an infinite demand for an arbitrage opportunity
absent any financial constraint. In this stochastic environment, we will see that carry-trade
portfolios generate losses with a non-zero probability in equilibrium. Thus, any risk-averse
agent would form finite portfolios. Trading limits here only play the role of a very tractable
substitute for risk aversion that is commonplace in models in which agents’ attitude towards
risk is not the main focus.11 An interesting extension consists in studying risk limits that
vary with exchange rate movements, as is the case in practice (see Hofmann, Shim and Shin
(2015)).
Local risk-neutrality implies that global investors choose corner portfolios. We deem
“long” a global investor who committed to maximum lending L+ at his last switching date,
and “short” one who committed to the maximum borrowing L−. We let xt denote the
fraction of long global investors at date t. Note that the paths of the process (xt)t∈R must
be Lipschitz continuous, with a Lipschitz constant smaller than λ. The aggregate real net
lending LTn taking place at an arrival date Tn is then equal to
LTn = xTnL
+ + (1− xTn)L−. (26)
It corresponds to stopping the process of the (real) aggregate committed amount by global
investors Lt at the arrival dates Tn at which this amount is actually lent (or borrowed).
Suppose that a global investor has a chance to revise his position at a date t such that
Tn−1 < t < Tn. (27)
Denoting Tλ his next switching date, the expected unit return from the carry trade — the
11In recent work, Albagli, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski (2015) use a similar assumption to generate a high
tractability and thus new insights in a standard noisy REE asset-pricing model. The binary portfolio choice
of risk-neutral carry traders is particularly suited to our iterated-dominance solution.
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expected value from committing to lend one additional real unit to each future cohort until
Tλ — is
Πt = Et
[∑
m≥0
1{Tλ>Tn+m}
Rm
PTn+mSTn+m
PTn+m+1STn+m+1
(
STn+m+1ITn+m+1
STn+mR
− 1 + wTn+m
)]
. (28)
Expression (28) states that the global investor earns the carry-trade return associated
with each arrival date until he gets a chance to revise his position.12
The evolution of the economy is then fully described by two state variables, the exogenous
state variable wt and the endogenous state variable xt. The exogenous state variable wt
directly affects only the expected return on carry trade Πt while the endogenous one xt
directly affects both the carry trade return and the equilibrium variables (LTn , ITn , PTn , STn)
of the domestic economy. We are now equipped to define an equilibrium.
An equilibrium is characterized by a process xt that is adapted to the filtration of wt and
has Lipschitz-continuous paths such that:
12To arrive at (28), note that investing one real unit at arrival date Tj costs USD PTjSTj . The net rate of
return (STj+1/STj )ITj+1 − I∗Tj+1 applies to this dollar amount. The resulting consumption for old households
at date Tj+1 is then this USD profit divided by PTj+1STj+1 . Re-arranging and discounting these terms yields
(28).
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ITn+1 = R
(
PTn
PTn−1
)1+Φ
, (29)
ETn
[
ITn+1PTn
PTn+1
]
=
R
LTn +W
, (30)
STn+1
STn
=
(
PTn+1
PTn
) −1
1−γ
, (31)
dxt
dt
=
{
−λxt if Πt < 0,
λ(1− xt) if Πt > 0,
(32)
where
Πt = Et
[∑
m≥0
1{Tλ>Tn+m}
Rm
PTn+mSTn+m
PTn+m+1STn+m+1
(
STn+m+1ITn+m+1
STn+mR
− 1 + wTn+m
)]
.
Exactly as in the perfect-foresight case, equilibrium in the domestic economy is character-
ized by the Taylor rule (29), households’ Euler equation (30), and the pass-through equation
(31). Equation (32) states that global investors make optimal portfolio choices. They become
long at switching dates at which the expected return on the carry trade is positive (or remain
long if this was their previous positions), and short if this is negative (or remain short if this
was their previous positions).
Note that relations (29) and (31) are identical to their counterparts in the perfect-foresight
case except for the re-labelling of dates. They are in particular log-linear. Conversely,
the Euler equation (30) now features an expectation over the inverse of inflation given the
stochastic environment. As a result, the system of equations defining the equilibrium is no
longer log-linear in Lt + W . For the remainder of the paper, we will solve for a linearized
version of these equilibrium equations:
Linear approximation. We solve for an equilibrium process xt that satisfies the first-
order expansions of (29), (30), (31), and (32) in l and l.
This boils down to normalizing W = 113 and assuming that L+ and L− are sufficiently
small that global investors have a small impact on the domestic real rate, the rate of inflation
13so that the real rate is R when xt = 0.
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and the appreciation/depreciation of the nominal exchange rate between two arrival dates.
Importantly, this does not rule out that the domestic price level PTj and nominal exchange
rate level STj possibly reach large or small values because the cumulative impact of inflows
can be large if global investors trade in the same direction for a long time. Nor does it
imply restrictions on the size of the interest rate differential since wt is unbounded. All that
it imposes is that the domestic real rate and nominal variables do not fluctuate too much
between two arrival dates.
Up to this approximation, we have:
Proposition 2 (Unique equilibrium) Suppose that
γ > Φ (1− γ) . (33)
For µ/λ sufficiently large, there exists a unique equilibrium defined by a decreasing Lipschitz
function f such that
dxt = λ
(
1{wt>f(xt)} − xt
)
dt, (34)
where 1{.} denotes the indicator function.
Stochastic bifurcations. Equation (34) states that the equilibrium aggregate position
of global investors xt obeys an ordinary differential equation controlled by the stochastic
process wt. Such processes are known as stochastic bifurcation models, and are extensively
studied in Bass and Burdzy (1999) and Burdzy et al. (1998). These mathematics papers
establish in particular that for almost every sample path of wt, there exists a unique Lips-
chitz solution xt to the differential equation (34) defining the price dynamics for f Lipschitz
decreasing. We will repeatedly use this result throughout the proof of Proposition 2.14
Equilibrium dynamics. The frontier f divides the (w, x)-space into two regions.
Proposition 2 states that in the unique equilibrium, any investor decides to be long when the
system is to the right of the frontier f at his switching date, and short when it is on the left
of the frontier. Thus, net lending (and therefore the nominal exchange rate) will tend to rise
14These papers also establish convergence results ensuring that the process xt that we obtain when lin-
earizing in l and l converges to the exact equilibrium process as l, l→ 0.
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w = f (x)
x 
w 
dx = λ 1− x( )dt
dx = −λxdt
Figure 1: Equilibrium dynamics. The frontier f divides the (w,x)-space into two regions. In the unique equilibrium, 
lending increases in the right-hand region and declines in the left.  
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in the right-hand region, and tend to fall in the left-hand region, as indicated by the arrows
in Figure 1.
The main features of these dynamics can be seen from Figure 1. Starting from the red
dot on the frontier, a positive shock on w will pull the system to the right of it. Unless the
path of wt is such that a larger negative shock brings it back on the frontier immediately, a
more likely scenario is that lending grows for a while so that xt becomes close to 1, in which
case dxt
dt
becomes close to 0. If cumulative negative shocks on w eventually lead the system
back to the left of the frontier, then there are large outflows
dxt
dt
' −λ.
These dynamics therefore correspond to prolonged episodes of appreciation of the do-
mestic currency, large cumulated capital inflows, and benign domestic financial conditions
following a negative shock on the US interest rate. Subsequent small increases in the US
interest rate do not reverse these dynamics until a tipping point is reached. This point trig-
gers a large currency depreciation, important capital outflows, a crash in the domestic bond
market, domestic inflation, and a tightening of domestic monetary policy. These features of
sudden stops correspond to that experienced by the “Fragile Five” (Brazil, Indonesia, India,
South Africa and Turkey) following Bernanke’s testimony about the possible “tapering” of
the highly accommodative US monetary policy (see Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki, 2015).
It is admittedly not surprising that the equilibrium displays periods of capital inflows or
outflows given that investors’ positions are assumed to be sticky and bounded. The interest-
ing part of these dynamics lies in our view in the subtle nonlinear impact of the fundamental
(the US interest rate) on investors’ coordination. After they have reaped positive excess
returns on carry trades for a long time, only a large accumulation of negative news can
lead investors to switch beliefs about each others’ future positions and thus about the prof-
itability of carry trades. When the tipping point is reached, however, a small incremental
negative news has a disproportionate impact on investors’ position. We consider this to be a
signature pattern of episodes of destabilizing speculation that stochastic-bifurcation models
capture parsimoniously.
Expected return on carry trades. The expected return on the carry trade at date t,
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Πt, is zero if and only if wt = f(xt). It is positive if (wt, xt) is on the right of the frontier f
in the (w, x)-space and negative if it is on the left of f . Thus, carry trades exhibit abnormal
expected returns that increase in the net open interest. They are risky trades though, as an
investor can be stuck in a position that generates losses when other investors revert their
trade before his trade unwinds.
Congestion effects. Condition (33) is already the one that generates multiple steady-
states in the perfect-foresight case. Here, it is necessary in order to obtain a decreasing
frontier f , and thus large bifurcations, for exactly the same economic reasons.15 It is not
sufficient, however. The additional condition that µ/λ be sufficiently large is also required in
order to obtain a decreasing frontier. It means that capital must flow sufficiently smoothly
into the domestic economy: The arrival rate of domestic trading counterparties for global
investors must be sufficiently large relative to the frequency at which global investors can
revise their committed position. We offer detailed explanations for this condition in the proof
of Proposition 2 below. The broad intuition is that if this condition is not satisfied, then
global investors create sufficiently large congestion externalities for each other that this acts
as a stabilizing force that more than offsets the destabilizing ones presented in the perfect-
foresight case. Otherwise stated, if the capital market is too congested, then capital inflows
cannot destabilize the small open economy even when its monetary rule is sufficiently passive
that (33) holds. This interplay between the stance of monetary policy and the ability of the
domestic capital market to channel foreign flows is novel, to our knowledge.
Proof of Proposition 2
Our proof follows the same roadmap as that in Frankel and Pauzner (2000), with additional
complexity induced by the congestion effects.
More precisely, the first step consists in using relations (29) to (31) to express the nominal
exchange rate and interest rate as functions of the expected future paths of capital inflows
Lt. This yields in turn a relatively simple expression for the expected return on the carry
trade Πt as a function of these expected capital inflows:
15Absent this condition, the frontier would be increasing, and small shocks on wt would translate into
small shocks on xt in the same direction so that the system remains close to the frontier.
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Lemma 3 (Linearized expected return) At first-order w.r.t. l, l, the expected return
on the carry trade is
Πt =
∫ +∞
0
ξ(v)Et
[
lt+ v
µ
]
dv +
wt
λ
µ
+ ρ
, (35)
where
ξ(v) =
(
χω
ω − ρ− λ
µ
− 1
)
e−(ρ+
λ
µ)v − χω
ω − ρ− λ
µ
e−ωv, (36)
lt = xtl + (1− xt) l, (37)
ρ = 1− 1
R
, (38)
ω =
Φ
1 + Φ
, (39)
χ =
γ
(1− γ) Φ . (40)
Proof. See the appendix. 
The factor ξ(v) that discounts future capital inflows in (35) is first negative, then positive
as v spans [0,+∞).16 Thus, an increase in the expected net inflow Et[lt+s] raises the date-t
expected return on the carry trade only for s sufficiently large, and reduces it otherwise. This
is the key technical difference between our setup and the abstract games studied by Burdzy,
Frankel, and Pauzner, in which the expected payoff at date-t increases in (their equivalent
of) lt+s for each s, t.
This property of ξ(v) reflects congestion externalities. Whereas an investor benefits from
the long positions of his successors after he has lent to the domestic economy, inflows occur-
ring between a switching date and the next arrival date at which he will actually lend are
conversely detrimental to him. They lead to a currency appreciation that reduces the upside
from the carry trades executed once the arrival dates occur. With constant inflows (as was
the case in the perfect-foresight economy), this congestion effect is not sufficient to stabilize
the economy when χ > 1.17 In this stochastic version of the model, however, expecting
higher future inflows does not always necessarily translate into higher expected profits if the
16Notice that this is so regardless of the sign of ω − ρ− λµ .
17To see this, note that
∫
ξ = (χ− 1)/(λ/µ+ ρ) > 0.
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market is too congested, as an investor would rather see outflows and dollar appreciation
between his switching date and the date at which he starts his streak of carry trades. The
following lemma is instrumental. It shows that this effect is not sufficient to stabilize capital
flows when markets are not too congested—a situation that seems empirically plausible.
Lemma 4 (Uncongested capital market) Suppose that χ > 1. There exists M such that
for all µ/λ > M , the following is true. Suppose that two processes x1t and x
2
t satisfy
0 < x10 ≤ x20 < 1,
For i = 1, 2, dxit = λ
(
1{wt>f i(xit)} − x
i
t
)
dt,
where f i is decreasing Lipschitz and f 2 ≤ f 1. Then the expected profit at date 0 is smaller
under x1t than x
2
t , strictly so if f
1 6= f 2 and/or x10 6= x20.
Proof. See the appendix. 
Lemma 4 states that if (33) holds and µ/λ is sufficiently large, then future inflows make
current carry trades more attractive because the reinforcing effect overcomes the congestion
effect. In the balance of the paper, we suppose that the conditions in Lemma 4 are satisfied.
We now show that there is in this case a unique Lipschitz process xt that satisfies the
equilibrium conditions.18
First, the proof of Lemma 4 also shows that the case in which xt obeys
dxt
dt
= −λxt for
all u ≥ 0 corresponds to a lower bound on the expected carry-trade return. When xt obeys
such dynamics, there exists a frontier f0 such that
wt = f0(xt) =⇒ Πt = 0. (41)
The frontier f0 is decreasing from Lemma 4 (with f
1 = f 2 = +∞) and is clearly affine and
thus Lipschitz.19 Thus an admissible equilibrium process must be such that investors who
have a chance to switch when the system is on the right of f0 become long.
18One can see by inspection fo the proof of Lemma 4 that M does not depend on the volatility σ of wt, a
useful property when we will let σ → 0 in the following.
19The frontier simply obtains from writing Et
[
lt+ vµ
]
= l +
(
l − l)xte−λvµ in (35).
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Define now f1 such that
wt = f1(xt) =⇒ Πt = 0 (42)
if for all u ≥ 0,
dxt+u
du
=
{
−λxt+u if wt+u < f0(xt+u),
λ(1− xt+u) if wt+u > f0(xt+u).
(43)
That is, f1 is such that an investor is indifferent between being long or short when the system
is on f1 at his switching date if he believes that other investors become long if and only if
they are on the right of f0. This function f1 must be decreasing. Suppose otherwise that
two points (w, x) and (w′, x′) on f1 satisfy
x′ > x,
w′ ≥ w.
Then applying Lemma 4 with f 2 = f0, f
1 = f0 +w
′−w contradicts that both points generate
the same expected carry-trade return. We also show in the appendix that f1 is Lipschitz,
with a Lipschitz constant smaller than that of f0.
By iterating this process, we obtain a limit f∞ of the sequence of frontiers (fn)n≥0 that
is decreasing Lipschitz as a limit of decreasing Lipschitz functions with decreasing Lipschitz
constants. The process
dxt
dt
=
{
−λxt if wt < f∞(xt),
λ(1− xt) if wt > f∞(xt)
(44)
is an admissible equilibrium since by construction, if all investors switch to being short to
the left of f∞ and to being long to the right, the indifference point for an investor also lies
on f∞. We now show that this is the only equilibrium process.
Consider a translation to the left of the graph of f∞ in (w, x) so that the whole of the
curve lies in a region where wt is sufficiently small that being short is dominant regardless of
the dynamics of xt. Call this translation f
′
0. To the left of f
′
0, going short is dominant. Then
construct f ′1 as the rightmost translation of f
′
0 such that an investor must choose to be short
to the left of f
′
1 if he believes that other investors will play according to f
′
0. By iterating this
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A B 
Figure 2: Uniqueness of the limiting boundary. This figure illustrates the argument for the uniqueness of the 
equilibrium boundary separating the two regions. The boundary f’∞ coincides with f∞. 
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process, we obtain a sequence of translations to the right of f
′
0. Denote by f
′
∞ the limit of
the sequence. Refer to Figure 2.
The boundary f ′∞ does not necessarily define an equilibrium strategy, since it was merely
constructed as a translation of f
′
0. However, we know that if all others were to play according
to the boundary f ′∞, then there is at least one point A on f
′
∞ where the investor is indifferent.
If there were no such point as A, this would imply that f ′∞ is not the rightmost translation,
as required in the definition.
We claim that f ′∞ and f∞ coincide exactly. The argument is by contradiction. Suppose
that we have a gap between f ′∞ and f∞. Then, choose point B on f∞ such that A and B have
the same height - i.e. correspond to the same x. But then, since the shape of the boundaries
of f ′∞ and f∞ and the values of x are identical, the paths starting from A must have the
same distribution as the paths starting from B up to the constant difference in the initial
values of w. This contradicts the hypothesis that an investor is indifferent between the two
actions both at A and at B. If he were indifferent at A, he would strictly prefer being long
at B, and if he is indifferent at B, he would strictly prefer being short when in A. But we
constructed A and B so that investors are indifferent in both A and B. Thus, there is only
one way to make everything consistent, namely to conclude that A = B. Thus, there is no
“gap”, and we must have f ′∞ = f∞. 
Proposition 2 shows that adding exogenous shocks wt to the carry return eliminates the
indeterminacy of the perfect-foresight case. More precisely, equilibrium uniqueness stems
from the interplay of these shocks with the fact that each investor, when he receives a
switching opportunity, needs to form beliefs about the decisions of the investors that will
have an opportunity to switch between now and his next switching date. Suppose that (wt, xt)
is close to a dominance region in which investors would prefer a course of action for sure,
but just outside it. If wt was fixed, it may be possible to construct an equilibrium for both
actions, but when wt moves around stochastically, it will wander into the dominance region
between now and the next opportunity that the trader gets to switch with some probability.
This gives the investor some reason to hedge his bets and take one course of action for sure.
But then, this shifts out the dominance region, and a new round of reasoning takes place
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given the new boundary, and so on.
Remark 1. (Bounded shocks to the US rate) We model the interest-rate differential
as a Brownian motion for expositional simplicity. It is easy to see that we could write it
as d(wt), where wt is a standard Brownian motion, and d a Lipschitz increasing function,
possibly bounded as long as there are still dominant actions for wt sufficiently large or small.
Remark 2. (Transitory shocks to the US rate) While a strong persistence in shocks
to the US rate is undoubtedly realistic, extensions of this framework can also accommodate
for various forms of mean-reversion (Burdzy, Frankel, and Pauzner, 2001, or Frankel and
Burdzy, 2005).
The case of small shocks
The limiting case in which the volatility σ of the interest-rate differential tends to zero yields
useful insights. It is possible to characterize the shape of the frontier f in this case.
In this section we denote the frontier fσ to emphasize its dependence on σ. Suppose the
economy is in the state (fσ(xt) , xt) at date t. That is, it is on the equilibrium frontier. For
some arbitrarily small ε > 0, introduce the stopping times
T1 = inf
u≥0
{xt+u /∈ (ε, 1− ε)} ,
T0 = sup
0≤u<T1
{wt+u 6= fσ (xt+u)} .
In words, T1 is the first date at which xt gets close to 0 or 1, and T0 is the last date at which
xt crosses the frontier before T1. If T0 is small in distribution, it means that the economy is
prone to bifurcations. That is, it never stays around the frontier for long. Upon hitting it, it
quickly heads towards extreme values of x. The next proposition shows that this is actually
the most likely scenario when σ is small. This, in turn, yields a simple explicit determination
of the frontier.
Proposition 5 (Small shocks)
1. As σ → 0, T0 converges to 0 in distribution, and the probability that dxtdt > 0 (respectively
dxt
dt
< 0) over [T0, T1] converges to 1− xt (xt respectively).
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2. As σ → 0, the frontier fσ tends to an affine function. For µ/λ sufficiently large, the
slope of this function is increasing in Φ and decreasing in γ.
Proof. See the appendix. 
First, Proposition 5 clears the concern that in equilibrium, x would only exhibit small
fluctuations around a fixed value because Brownian paths cross the frontier too often. As σ
becomes smaller, the system exhibits more frequent bifurcations towards extremal values of
x. When the system reaches the frontier, it is all the more likely to bifurcate towards capital
outflows when cumulative inflows have been large (x large). Thus the model does generate
“destabilizing carry trades,” whereby global investors generate self-justified excess returns
on the carry trade that persist beyond the exogenous trigger until a large reversal occurs.
The second point in Proposition 5 relates the slope of the frontier fσ to the monetary
parameters of the model Φ and γ in this case of small shocks. The slope of the frontier affects
the dynamics of capital inflows and in turn the exchange-rate dynamics. If the graph of the
frontier is closer to being horizontal in the (w, x) plane, then the system should cross the
frontier less often, and thus do so only for more extreme values of x. Carry-trade returns
should in this case exhibit more serial correlation and fatter tails. Point 2 states that, at
least for µ/λ sufficiently large, the frontier is flatter when Φ is smaller, and γ larger. In other
words, if monetary policy does not respond much to capital inflows, then carry trade returns
should exhibit more skewness.
4 Empirical content
Our model generates a rich set of qualitative features, of which many have empirical impli-
cations. As a by-product of our analysis, we provide in particular a novel explanation for
the seemingly high Sharpe ratio generated by carry-trade strategies.
Profitability of FX carry trades
The equilibrium expected return on the carry trade increases with respect to w and x, it is
positive on the right of the frontier f in the (w, x) plane and negative on the left. On the
other hand, the interest-rate differential increases in w and decreases in x. We have indeed:
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Lemma 6 (Interest-rate differential) At first-order, the interest-rate differential at a
given arrival date Tn is given by
R
(
wTn − lTn −
1
1 + Φ
∫ +∞
0
e−ωsETn
[
lTn+ sµ
]
ds
)
. (45)
Proof. See the appendix. 
The interest-rate differential increases w.r.t. w but decreases w.r.t. l (and thus x) because
the current domestic real rate is lower and future deflation more likely when l is large. Thus
the expected return on the carry trade is not unambiguously increasing in the interest-rate
differential. Yet, when the interest-rate differential is sufficiently large in absolute terms, it
must be that the system is on the right (left) of the frontier when the differential is positive
(negative). Thus, we have:
A positive (negative) interest-rate differential predicts a positive (negative) return on the
carry-trade for sufficiently large absolute differentials.
In particular, for l, l sufficiently small, most of the interest-rate differential is due to
the exogenous component w. The threshold above which a positive (negative) interest-
rate differential is associated with a positive (negative) excess return on the carry trade is
arbitrarily small. This rationalization of carry-trade returns as self-fulfilling genuine excess
returns contrasts with existing theories that seek to explain the return on carry trades as a
compensation for (possibly mismeasured) risk. Farhi and Gabaix (2015) thorougly survey
this existing literature. We do not deny that a significant fraction of carry-trade returns may
reflect risk premia, and view our theory as a complement to such risk-based considerations
rather than a competing alternative.
Peso problem
A large literature argues that the return on the carry trade partly reflects a risk premium for
rare and extreme events that may not show in finite samples (see, e.g., Farhi and Gabaix,
2015, or Lewis, 2007, and the references herein). We closely connect to this literature as
follows. Fix  > 0 small. The expected return on the carry trade is 0 starting both from
(f(), ) and (f(1− ), 1− ) in the (w, x) plane. Yet from Proposition 5, as σ becomes small,
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most paths starting from (f(), ) will exhibit long periods of appreciation of the domestic
currency ended with rare (and large) depreciations, while paths starting from (f(1−), 1−)
will feature a symmetric prolonged depreciation. The interest-rate differential is positive in
the former case and negative in the latter. Thus, due to rare reversals, finite samples should
yield that a positive interest-rate differential predicts a positive excess return on the carry
trade even when the true expected return is zero. More generally, rare reversals imply that
finite samples should lead to an overestimation of the absolute magnitude of abnormal returns
on the carry trade.
Profitability of FX momentum strategies
Proposition 5 shows that as σ → 0, the system often bifurcates in one direction. This
implies that, at least at a sufficiently short horizon, returns are positively autocorrelated, so
that momentum strategies in FX markets should generate a positive excess return. The key
economic force behind this profitability of momentum strategies is that once carry traders
coordinate on a course of action, they stick to it until a sufficiently large reversal of the
interest-rate differential leads them to switch to a different strategy. Such a rationalization
of momentum returns with coordination motives is novel to our knowledge.
Monetary policy and carry-trade returns
In addition to relating to the above existing empirical findings, the model also generates a
new range of predictions on the relationship between the stance of monetary policy and the
distribution of the returns on carry-trade strategies. Proposition 5 suggests that the frontier
is flatter when Φ is smaller and γ larger. Otherwise stated, if an economy is such that the CPI
is not too sensitive to the exchange rate, and/or the central bank not too aggressive, then
this economy should be more prone to large fluctuations in carry-trade activity because it
will experience more prolonged bifurcations. Thus the returns on carry-trade and momentum
strategies should have fatter tails.
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5 Concluding remarks
The independence of monetary policy under liberalised capital flows and floating exchange
rates has been a benchmark principle in international finance. In our paper, we have explored
a parsimonious model of global investors facing each other in a dynamic global game and
found that under plausible conditions, the model generates boom bust cycles associated with
coordinated capital inflows and outflows. In such a setting, monetary conditions depend on
the coordination outcome of investors who have access to the domestic bond market, as well
as on the economic fundamentals. Thus, we qualify the proposition that a floating exchange
rate guarantees monetary autonomy by showing that as capital flows more smoothly into a
small open economy, then a commitment to a more aggressive monetary response to capital
flows is required in order to discourage destabilizing carry trades.
Assuming that households are risk-neutral over late consumption dramatically simpli-
fies the analysis. With strictly concave preferences, the current real rate would depend on
consumption growth, so that we could no longer abstract from the impact of foreign lend-
ing on quantities and thus production in the domestic economy as we are able to do here.
We find it useful to derive our novel mechanism for self-fulfilling profitable carry trades in
a highly tractable framework that describes the interplays of the ingredients at work in a
fully transparent fashion. An interesting avenue for future research, which would be more
simulation-based, is the study of the impact of such carry trades on quantities under more
standard preferences.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 3
The first-order expansion of the Euler equation (30):
ln ITn+1 + lnEt
[
PTn
PTn+1
]
= lnR− ln(LTn +W ) (46)
in l, l yields:
ln ITn+1 − Et
[
ln
PTn+1
PTn
]
= lnR− lTn (47)
where
lTn = l(1− xTn) + lxTn . (48)
Combined with the Taylor rule (29), this yields domestic inflation as a function of future
expected inflows as in the perfect-foresight case:
ln
PTn
PTn−1
= −
∑
k≥0
ETn
[
lTn+k
]
(1 + Φ)k+1
, (49)
As in the perfect-foresight case, (31) yields in turn:
ETn
[
ln
STn+1ITn+1
RSTn
]
=
γ
1− γ
∑
k≥0
ETn
[
lTn+k+1
]
(1 + Φ)k+1
− lTn . (50)
One can write (28) as
Πt = Et
[∑
m≥0
1{Tλ>Tn+m}
Rm
ETn+m
[
PTn+mSTn+m
PTn+m+1STn+m+1
(
STn+m+1ITn+m+1
RSTn+m
− 1 + wTn+m
)]]
. (51)
At first-order w.r.t. l, l,
ETn+m
[
PTn+mSTn+m
PTn+m+1STn+m+1
(
STn+m+1ITn+m+1
RSTn+m
− 1
)]
= ETn+m
[
ln
STn+m+1ITn+m+1
RSTn+m
]
(52)
=
γ
1− γ
∑
k≥0
ETn+m
[
lTn+m+k+1
]
(1 + Φ)k+1
− lTn+m . (53)
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Thus,
Πt = Et
[∫ +∞
0
∑
m≥1
µm
( s
R
)m−1 e−(λ+µ)s
(m− 1)!
[∫ +∞
0
γ
1−γ
∑
k≥1 µ
k uk−1
(k−1)!
e−µu
(1+Φ)k
lt+s+udu
−lt+s + wt
]
ds
]
,
(54)
= Et
[∫ +∞
0
e−(
λ
µ
+ρ)s
(∫ +∞
0
χωe−ωult+ s+u
µ
du− lt+ s
µ
+ wt
)
ds
]
, (55)
=
∫ +∞
0
e−(
λ
µ
+ρ)v
(
χω
∫ v
0
e−(ω−
λ
µ
−ρ)udu− 1
)
Et
[
lt+ v
µ
]
dv +
wt
λ
µ
+ ρ
, (56)
and integrating yields the result. (Note that we ignored here the terms in wtlt because we
use this approximation of Πt only for initial values wt of the same order of magnitude as lt.)
A.2 Proof of Lemma 4
Suppose χ > 1. Consider two processes x1t and x
2
t that satisfy the conditions stated in Lemma
4 with x10 < x
2
0. Lemma 2 in Burdzy, Frankel and Pauzner (1998) states that almost surely,
x2t ≥ x1t for all t ≥ 0. (57)
This implies in particular that whenever investors switch to being long along a sample path
of (wt, x
1
t ), so do they along the sample path of (wt, x
2
t ) that corresponds to the same sample
path of wt. This is because it must be that (wt, x
2
t ) is on the right of the frontier f
2 whenever
(wt, x
1
t ) is on the right of the frontier f
1. Thus, the process
yt = x
2
t − x1t (58)
satisfies
0 < y0 < 1, (59)
dyt
dt
= λ(t − yt), (60)
In order to prove the Lemma, we only need to find M such that for all µ/λ > M ,
∆ =
∫ +∞
0
((
χω
ω − ρ− λ
µ
− 1
)
e−(
λ
µ
+ρ)v − χω
ω − ρ− λ
µ
e−ωv
)
y v
µ
dv ≥ 0. (61)
for all deterministic process yt that obeys (59) and (60). The result then obtains from taking
expectations over all paths of wt.
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To prove (61), we introduce the function ζ that satisfies
dζ(v)
dv
= −
((
χω
ω−ρ−λ
µ
− 1
)
e−(
λ
µ
+ρ)v − χω
ω−ρ−λ
µ
e−ωv
)
,
lim+∞ ζ = 0.
Integrating by parts, we have
∆ = ζ(0)y0 +
1
µ
∫ +∞
0
ζ(v)
dy v
µ
dv
dv, (62)
= ζ(0)y0 +
λ
µ
∫ +∞
0
ζ(v)( v
µ
− y v
µ
)dv. (63)
Further,
y v
µ
= y0e
−λv
µ +
λ
µ
∫ v
0
e−
λ
µ
(v−u)u
µ
du, (64)
and thus
∆ = y0
(
ζ(0)− λ
µ
∫ +∞
0
ζ(v)e−
λv
µ dv
)
(65)
+
λ
µ
[∫ +∞
0
 v
µ
(
ζ(v)− λ
µ
∫ +∞
v
ζ(u)e−
λ
µ
(u−v)du
)]
. (66)
We have
lim
λ
µ
→0
ζ(0) =
χ− 1
ρ
> 0, (67)
ζ is increasing then decreasing beyond a value that stays bounded as λ/µ tends to zero, and∫ +∞
0
ζ converges. Thus for λ/µ sufficiently small,
ζ(v)− λ
µ
∫ +∞
v
ζ(u)e−
λ
µ
(u−v)du (68)
is positive for all v ≥ 0, which yields that ∆ is positive, and concludes the proof.
A.3 Complement to the proof of Proposition 2
We prove here that f1 is Lipschitz with a constant that is smaller than that of f0, that we
denote K0. Suppose by contradiction that two points (wt, xt) and (w
′
t, x
′
t) on f1 satisfy
x′ > x, (69)
x′t − xt
wt − w′t
<
1
K0
. (70)
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We compare the paths x′t+u and xt+u corresponding to pairs of paths of w
′
t+u and wt+u that
satisfy for all u ≥ 0
wt+u − w′t+u = wt − w′t. (71)
It must be that for such pairs of paths:
x′t+u − xt+u ≤ (x′t − xt)e−λu. (72)
Otherwise it would have to be the case that (w′, x′) can be on the right of f0 when (w, x) is
not. Suppose by contradiction that this can be. Let T denote the first time at which this
occurs. It must be that
K0e
−λT (x′t − xt) ≥ wt+T − w′t+T = wt − w′t, (73)
a contradiction with (70).
Thus along such paths of w′t+u−wt+u, x′t+u−xt+u shrinks at least as fast as when investors
switch to being short all the time. Together with (70), this implies that the expected return
on the carry trade cannot be the same in (wt, xt) and (w
′
t, x
′
t), a contradiction.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 5
The first point is a particular case of Theorem 2 in Burdzy, Frankel, and Pauzner (1998). To
prove the second point, notice that as σ → 0, starting from a point on the frontier,
Et [xt+v] ' (1− xt)
(
1− (1− xt)e−λv
)
+ x2t e
−λv (74)
because the system bifurcates upwards with probability 1 − xt and downwards with proba-
bility xt in the limit. Plugging this in (35) and writing that the expected return is zero yields
a slope of the frontier equal to
−(l − l)(χ− 1)
as λ/µ→ 0. This means that the absolute value of the slope of the frontier varies as χ w.r.t.
γ, Φ for σ, λ/µ sufficiently small. This proves the proposition.
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A.5 Proof of Lemma 6
We have
ITn+1 −R(1− wTn) = R
((
PTn
PTn−1
)1+Φ
− 1 + wTn
)
, (75)
' R
(
wTn − ETn
[∑
k≥0
lTn+k
(1 + Φ)k
])
, (76)
= R
(
wTn − lTn −
∫ +∞
0
∑
k≥1
µksk−1e−µs
(k − 1)!(1 + Φ)kETn [lTn+s] ds
)
, (77)
= R
(
wTn − lTn −
1
1 + Φ
∫ +∞
0
e−ωsETn
[
lTn+ sµ
]
ds
)
. (78)
This proves the lemma.
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